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Oakeshott was a philosopher as well as an historian.  He engaged in philosophy by reflecting 
upon the character of experience and was an historian of political thought in examining the 
historical conditions in which distinct forms of political thinking arise.  For Oakeshott these 
two activities are separate. Philosophy understands experience in an unconditional and 
general way. It understands the postulates of activities, such as art, history and practical life. 
It conceptualizes the experiential orientation of thinking historically, practising science, 
contemplating artistic images and negotiating the twists and turns of practical life.  Insofar as 
it is philosophical, thought does not engage with practical tasks, recognize how the past has 
changed into the present, contemplate scenes artistically or generate hypothetical scientific 
laws. Rather it conceptualizes what we are up to in undertaking practical action or in tracing 
antecedent events, which relate to a political action such as the referendum decision of the 
UK to leave the European Union. An historian understanding an event such as Brexit, the 
prospective withdrawal of the UK from the European Union, relates the referendum decision 
to leave the EU to past events that preceded it and rendered it possible. So a series of events 
and developing attitudes within the Conservative Party might be invoked to explain why 
Cameron considered it useful to stage a referendum on this issue of EU membership. At the 
same time historical events and developing attitudes in the UK to issues relating to UK 
membership of the EU might be referenced to explain the vote for Brexit. The historian by 
his study of events preceding the referendum decision to withdraw from the EU would not be 
committed to either supporting or denouncing Brexit. The moral and instrumental preferences 
of practical life are irrelevant to historical understanding. Likewise the historian does not 
have to frame a philosophical understanding of the postulates of history to justify her 




unquestioned, but the historian can still provide a convincing account of an historical topic. 
Hence for Oakeshott, philosophy, history and practice are separate from one another and 
according to some of the idioms that he uses to describe their relations, they are insulated 
from one another. Yet, in fact, are philosophy and history distinct from one another? Are 
philosophical and historical forms of inquiry to be considered altogether distinct from one 
another? In this essay I will argue that they are intertwined in Oakeshott’s own account of the 
state, notwithstanding his own reading of their distinctness.1  Of course to criticize Oakeshott 
on this score is susceptible to the caveat entertained by Minogue in his essay, “The Fate of 
Rationalism in Oakeshott’s Thought,” “As ever with Oakeshott, the detail of the argument is 
marvelously suggestive, and its development so subtle that it can be criticized only by the 
most brutish grasp of what he might be up to.”2 If critiquing Oakeshott is hazardous, to 
accept his self-understanding of his enterprise is misplaced if it means maintaining a sense of 
the independence of modes of thought from one another that cannot be sustained in practice. 
In what follows I will run through Oakeshott’s practice as an historian of political thought 
and then invoke his philosophical account of the state and in so doing show how they are not 
discreet activities but are inter-related.  
 
II - Oakeshott: Historian of Political Thought 
 
In the lecture series on the history of political thought that Oakeshott delivered at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science in the 1960s he provided a history of the 
development of political thought.  These lectures, now published posthumously as Lectures in 
the History of Political Thought, differ from preceding lecture series that concentrated upon 




theory are situated. They are historical in character and set out a basis for explaining political 
thought historically. They show Oakeshott’s understanding of the contextual setting for 
political thought. He relates historic theories of politics to the traditions and forms of political 
experience associated with differing political regimes. Oakeshott outlines the political 
experience of the Ancient Greeks and Romans, the character of medieval government, and 
the nature of a modern European state. These then serve as contextual settings for the 
political thought of Ancient, medieval, and modern theorists. The lectures reflect Oakeshott’s 
understanding of how political thought depends upon the historical conditions of political 
practice and his method in the history of political thought is to relate theory to actual forms of 
political experience.3 At the outset of the lectures, Oakeshott declares, “History I take to be a 
mode of thought in which events, human actions, beliefs, manners of thinking are considered 
in relation to the conditions, or the circumstantial contexts in which they appeared.”4 He 
distinguishes such an approach from a scientific one, which would provide general laws to 
establish a causal understanding of past phenomena. Oakeshott’s historical approach renders 
past events, beliefs, and actions more intelligible by relating them to affiliated kinds of 
things, such as beliefs and actions rather than to record the regularities with which they occur. 
The thought is that contextualizing ideas in the broader context of a political culture enhances 
understanding without either establishing their necessity or justifying them in a general 
normative sense.5 
In his Lectures in the History of Political Thought Oakeshott is at pains to highlight how 
his enterprise disavows a teleological conception of the progress or regress of political 
thought over time, which would imply a philosophical reading of history.  He emphasizes the 
distinctness of particular forms of past thinking to the extent that he denies the prospect of a 
continuous history of political thought. He observes, “I want to avoid the appearance of 




Oakeshott’s Lectures in the History of Political Thought, then, do not provide an overall 
account of the historical development of political thought but instead concentrate upon 
specific historical periods. Thompson in “Michael Oakeshott on the History of Political 
Thought” questions their status as exemplifying Oakeshott’s notion of a history of political 
thought. For Thompson, “they are sophisticated lectures, but their purpose is introductory.” 7 
Notwithstanding their introductory character, however, they reveal key aspects of 
Oakeshott’s notion of the history of political thought. As Thompson himself suggests, “But 
although the lectures are not the best source for Oakeshott’s conception of the history of 
political thought, they do contain some important observations central to that conception.”8 In 
relating past political thought to the public culture of past political contexts Oakeshott 
follows Hegel, whom he admires, but he is against the supervening teleology of Hegel and 
his philosophical history, which perceives a developmental continuity in the history of 
political thought. Oakeshott opposes the idea of a continuous history of political thought 
because he concentrates on distinct past forms of political thinking, which derive from past 
circumstances that are held to be necessarily distinct from the present. Oakeshott is against 
retrojecting onto the political past ideas without reference to their local contexts. Oakeshott 
may be said to be implacably opposed to grand narratives which either reduce history to 
philosophy or history to philosophy.9 Rather he relates political ideas to the political cultures 
within which past political thinkers operated.10 
To understand Greek political thought, Oakeshott invokes the political experience of the 
Greeks, analysing the conditions of their political culture and more specifically their political 
vocabulary and distinctive images of the world. He then focuses upon the political thought of 
Plato and Aristotle taking them as sifting and criticizing the current general beliefs about 
politics so as formulate coherent ideas.11 Again, Oakeshott imagines modern thinkers to be 




state. He identifies characteristics of the modern European state such as its composition of 
legally free human beings, its centralized and sovereign authority, and its inter-relations with 
other similar states as informing the theories of modern political thinkers. In considering 
forms of modern political thinking, he identifies an interpretation of the state, which, in 
relying upon organic and nationalistic formulas, suffers from its failure to register the 
constructed and free nature of the association of individuals in a modern state. In contrast, he 
recognizes how Calvin, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Mill, amongst others, theorize the 
state as an association of individuals, who associate together freely to achieve a variety of 
freely chosen purposes. 
 
III - History and Other Disciplines 
 
Oakeshott’s Lectures in the History of Political Thought assumes history to be a 
constructive activity, in which the past is different from the present, and it is also separate 
from philosophy, science, or the practical needs of the present. In Experience and Its Modes 
(1933) Oakeshott argues for the radical insulation of modes of experience from one another. 
Modes of experience, save for philosophy, namely history, science, and practice arrest 
experience in organizing it from a particular perspective, while philosophy reviews the 
conditions of experience completely, observing the limits of the other modes. Hence history 
is neither linked to philosophizing nor to current practical issues. In “The Voice of Poetry in 
the Conversation of Mankind,” an essay in Rationalism in Politics, Oakeshott reformulates 
how he sees relations between modes of experience, imagining that they relate to one another 
conversationally rather than operating completely independent of one another or being 
dependent upon one another.12 The character of the imagined conversation of mankind is 




The assumption is that interlocutors respect one another and that there is no supervening goal 
of the conversation. In “The Activity of Being and Historian,” another essay in Rationalism 
in Politics, Oakeshott observes a sharp divide between the historian’s study of the past and 
other ways of imagining the past. Oakeshott insists that the past of the historian is different 
from the practical, scientific, and aesthetic attitudes to the past. A practical attitude to the past 
looks to the past in the light of the present and hence assimilates the past to present concerns. 
For instance a lawyer is interested in the past insofar as it relates to the concerns of his client 
in the present. If evidence from the past can prove the innocence of a defendant whom a 
barrister is defending in a criminal case, then it will be used. The barrister is not interested in 
the past for its own sake. The historian in contrast studies the past for its own sake and 
respects its distinctness from present concerns. An historian in the present who wishes to 
defend the Normans will not do justice to what happened at the Battle of Hastings.14 
Oakeshott’s sympathy for Butterfield’s studies of the past reflects his distrust of Whig 
interpretations of history that reduce the past to the political ideology of the present.15 
Oakeshott is categorical in his recognition of the historian’s appreciation of the separation of 
past from present interests. Hence Oakeshott insists that philosophy should not determine the 
direction of historical inquiry. Philosophy can review the postulates of historical 
understanding, but its review is not judged to impose a pattern upon narratives of the past. 
Hegel’s philosophy of history supersedes the narrative of empirical pragmatic historians, but, 
for Oakeshott, Hegel in his philosophical history is undertaking philosophy not history. 
Likewise the demands of practical political life are not to dictate to the historian an account 
of the past, which is not justified evidentially. 
Yet Oakeshott, in fact, allows for significant connections between philosophy, political 
practice, and history, even if the three worlds are specified in distinctive ways. In his 




of the history of political philosophy by identifying it in terms of three traditions. The three 
traditions are the rational natural tradition, the tradition of will and artifice, and that of 
rational will.16 What Oakeshott has to say on this score is elliptical and yet suggestive for he 
implies that there are connections between philosophy, politics, and history. His identification 
of traditions in the history of political philosophy presumes that philosophical expertise is 
required. Political philosophy is a style of thought that is conceived as a distinct and highly 
abstract form of reflection on politics. Its style is not to be recognized by the relating of past 
events, the character of the style has to be appreciated and that demands first hand expertise 
of the subject matter. Its identification depends upon philosophical rather than historical 
expertise.17 This philosophical recognition of the character of philosophical argument is of a 
piece with what he has to say in his Lectures in the History of Political Thought. In this latter 
study he maintains that a presupposition of the inquiry is a prior identification of styles of 
political thought so that, for instance, explanatory and practical forms of thinking are 
distinguished from one another.18 In the “Introduction to Leviathan” Oakeshott discusses the 
nature of the three specified traditions of political philosophy by highlighting their textual 
masterpieces. Plato’s Republic is held to be the masterpiece of the rational natural tradition. 
Hobbes’s Leviathan is supreme in the tradition of will and artifice and Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right is exemplary in the tradition of rational will. Oakeshott’s identification of traditions in 
political philosophy unites political philosophies historically by noting their adherence to 
common if developing conceptual standpoints. Identification of and assessment of a tradition 
depends upon a mix of philosophical and historical forms of understanding. Hence, Oakeshott 
sees history as bearing upon philosophy and shows how the disciplines of history and 
philosophy are connected with one another. Again, he imagines that each of the traditions of 
political philosophy is aligned to practice in that each develops in relation to practical 




traditions reflects modern developments in various spheres of conduct, which is distinct from 
Plato’s assumptions about a natural order of things. This alignment of philosophy with 
historical conditions of practice is not to imply that Oakeshott either imagines that philosophy 
is prescriptive for practical life, or that philosophical ideas are to be reduced to practical 
interests or to historical moments. Its alignment with practice enables its understanding of 
practice but does not supply a recipe for political action. Oakeshott’s understanding of the 
ways in which modes of experience are related is finely balanced. On the one hand, he insists 
upon their independence throughout his career and yet the metaphor of a conversation 
between experiential activities allows for engagement between them but it is a form of 
engagement that is not taken to obtrude upon their character. In fact the relations between 
modes of experience bear significantly upon their individual character. A history of political 
philosophy presumes a philosophical understanding of its nature. The development of 
political philosophy depends upon an historical understanding of its commerce with practice. 
In “Practical Life and the Critique of Rationalism,” Smith rightly observes Oakeshott’s 
determination to isolate philosophy from practical considerations. He remarks, “The central 
thrust of Experience and Its Modes is to protect philosophy and the other modes of 
experience from the blandishments of praxis. ‘A philosophy of life,’ Oakeshott avers, ‘is a 
meaningless contradiction.’ Life—practical experience—and philosophy—the quest for 
intellectual coherence—remain fundamentally inimical to one another.”19 It is true that, for 
Oakeshott, political philosophy is not an ideology aiming to impact upon practice. In a 
posthumously published essay, “Political Philosophy” Oakeshott observes, “[W]e must 
expect from political philosophy no practical conclusions whatsoever.”20 Yet Oakeshott 
aligns the identities of political philosophies to particular historical contexts and understands 
political philosophy as arising out of practical experience and as developing historically. His 




consciously related to the development of the modern state and to a particular tradition of 
political philosophy. As McIntyre notes, Oakeshott in fact takes philosophical understanding 
to develop out of a practice of philosophy that resists specification in express terms. The 
tradition of philosophy suggests its implication in practice rather than abstract theory.21 
In On Human Conduct, a classic work of substantive political thought, Oakeshott 
employs a new and original vocabulary to specify the conditionality of political association, 
which is derived from reflection upon the development of the modern European state.22The 
work consists of three inter-related sections: (i) On the Theoretical Understanding of Human 
Conduct; (ii) On the Civil Condition; and (iii) On the Character of the Modern European 
State. The opening section is a theoretical exploration of the character of human conduct by 
theorizing its component conditions of agency and social practice. Oakeshott distinguishes 
the character of a practice from that of a process. A practice is constituted by the contingent 
beliefs of their human participating agents, while processes are composed of natural 
phenomena, which are determined by scientific hypotheses explaining the generic recurrence 
of patterns amidst change. Insofar as the three essays are mutually complementary, the 
relationship between social practices and their constituent reflective agents is held to 
demonstrate how individuals are enabled to participate in a scheme of social and political 
cooperation, which Oakeshott designates as civil association. Civil association, for Oakeshott, 
represents an ideal mode of political association, in which individuals consent to procedural 
rules of conduct, which regulate but do not determine the behavior of individuals. These rules 
do not prescribe particular forms of conduct because they depend upon individual 
interpretation of their application to particular circumstances. The rules shape but do not 
direct their actions, and hence allow for individuality and freedom in their performance. 
Oakeshott’s analysis of the postulates of the human condition and his related construction of 




formation of the modern European state, which intimates the form of civil conduct that is 
theorized in the preceding section, under the title, “On Civil Association.” Hence Oakeshott’s 
own political thought is shown to develop out of his historical understanding of the 
development of European politics. 
In delineating the history of the modern European state, Oakeshott distinguishes between 
two historic forms of political association, a societas and a universitas. A societas is a form 
of political association, which constitutes what Oakeshott terms the civil condition. In a 
societas individuals recognize the authority of a set of general laws, which provide a 
framework of order that permits them to follow their own independently formulated 
activities. It is a free association of individuals, who are united by their common commitment 
to establish a cooperative social framework that enables individuals to undertake their several 
self-chosen purposes and activities. A universitas, on the other hand, focuses upon achieving 
a common collective goal. Its members are unified by their determination to achieve a 
common purpose. Oakeshott takes the outlines of both forms of society to be discernible in 
modern European history. For Oakeshott, prospects for civil freedom are compromised by the 
contemporary strength of collectivism. In his account of the modern European state, 
Oakeshott refers to several political theorists, who have framed historic theories of a political 
association, which follow one or the other of his paradigmatic models of political association. 
His commentaries are economical but incisive. For instance, he identifies Machiavelli 
tellingly as a theorist of a societas. Likewise, Hobbes is perceived to be an outstanding 
theorist of a societas, while Bentham receives a masterly footnote that identifies him to be an 
energetic advocate of a universitas.23 His brief but compelling analysis of Hegel as a theorist 
of a societas interprets Hegel to be a political theorist, who, in framing an authoritative 
political philosophy, attends carefully to the experience of agents, social practices, and states 




Oakeshott’s On Human Conduct is an intricate analysis of the nature of human conduct, 
the character of an ideal civil association, and the development of the modern European state. 
These elements of analysis go together in that human beings are shown to be reflective and 
free agents, whose possibilities for undertaking freely self-chosen individual actions are 
enhanced by their subscription to a civil association, which in turn is shown to be intimated in 
historical development. While Oakeshott imagines historical understanding to be 
autonomous, his philosophical exploration of the conditions of political association depends 
upon an historical reading of modern European history. Oakeshott’s carefully contrived 
philosophical account of a state that allows for individuality and freedom and his antipathy 
towards collectivism are shaped by and in turn reflect upon his reading of European political 
history. His substantive political thought is constructed in the light of preceding historical 
developments of the political experience of modern Europe and the political theorizing of 
philosophical predecessors, notably that of Hobbes and Hegel, and his own substantive 
political thought in turn shapes his interest in the development of the modern state. On 
Human Conduct is a notable contribution to modern political thought. Its value derives from 
its drawing upon historical and philosophical forms of understanding. The ideal of civil 
association is related to the conditions of reflective practice that allow for individual agency 
in social contexts. The ideal of individuality and the value of civil association are related to 
conditions of agency but they also are intimated in the political experience of the modern 
world. This experience shows the feasibility of the ideals and their possibilities in concrete 
shape. Oakeshott blends historical and philosophical expertise in his account of the modern 
state which is at once philosophical and historical. 
 





Oakeshott is an idealist thinker, who was influenced by Hegel, both as a philosopher and 
more particularly as a political theorist. Hegel recognized the relative autonomy of a variety 
of modes theory and practice. He was a profoundly historical thinker, who imagined that all 
subjects including philosophy were historical in character. A significant difference between 
his philosophy and Plato’s for instance, involves his sense of the historical determination of 
human thought and practice.25 Yet Hegel imagines that philosophical history superseded 
other forms of history in supplying an absolute understanding of things. Hence he considered 
the Philosophy of Right to go beyond a merely historical justification of the conditions of a 
rational and just political association. Ultimately it may be said that Hegel reduces history to 
philosophy in allowing philosophy the final reconciliatory word on mankind’s engagement 
with experience.26 Perhaps Oakeshott’s sensitivity to the perils of advancing the claims of a 
single discipline over that of others informed his reading of the strict independence to be 
assigned to modes of experience or forms of understanding. Likewise he was critical of what 
he took to be Collingwood’s late dissolution of philosophy into history.27 It is beside the 
point that Collingwood’s later thought is best interpreted as maintaining an independence 
between philosophy and history, because it is clear that Oakeshott imagined that Collingwood 
had slipped into an error in reducing philosophy to history.28 
 Oakeshott aimed to guard against a reductive understanding of the relations between 
philosophy and history, just as practical undertakings are different from artistic 
contemplation, scientific understanding, philosophical speculation and historical 
understanding.  Even where he allows for relations between them, his designation of them as 
conversational sees each as constituted separately and engaging in talk that does not affect 
their identities. However, in his actual practice of history and political theory Oakeshott 
identifies political theorists as responding to historical change and his historical perspective 




state operates between history and philosophy.   The irony is that it is precisely this 
overlapping of modes of thinking that endows a value to his writings which is lacking in 
other perspectives. Hegel’s political philosophy is a testament to considered historical and 
philosophical thinking but its philosophical absolutism constitutes a grand narrative that 
devalues the openness and contingency of the historical process.29 
 Oakeshott’s practice of the history of political thought allows him to make a variety of 
connections in the history of political thought. Thompson, in a careful essay on Oakeshott as 
an historian of political thought, observes how Oakeshott distinguishes his approach from 
that of Skinner by allowing for a variety of forms of political thinking, which are not to be 
reduced to “ideology.”30 Skinner and the Cambridge School of the history of political thought 
have tended to interpret forms of political thought as being designed to justify or disrupt 
political authority, and this “ideological” reading of political thought has been applied to 
Hobbes and Machiavelli amongst others. Skinner has been concerned to disparage 
“influence” as a category in the history of political thought as he is skeptical of causal claims 
of one thinker influencing another when they are subject to differing ideological and political 
contexts.31  To deny the influence of one philosopher upon another across time implies that 
philosophy is not to operate as a distinct form of thinking, which appears implausible given, 
say Hegel’s own account of the impact of Plato and Aristotle on his thought. Oakeshott’s 
recognition that philosophy is a distinct form of thought allows for a way of reading its 
development that can take account of the impact of a preceding political philosopher upon a 
succeeding one.32 Oakeshott’s plausible criticism of Skinner turns upon his own recognition 
of the differing nature of particular forms of political thinking.  Political philosophy is not to 
be reduced to history and ideology. 
 The value of Oakeshott’s political thought and his theorizing about the state resides in 




sharp separation of them from one another. In On Human Conduct his reading of an ideal 
mode of political association is linked to his reading of the historical development of forms of 
the state in modern Europe. Philosophy is not thereby reduced to history, just as history is not 
to be seen as a mere instrument to the framing of a political philosophy. But if Oakeshott 
avoids the reduction of one form of thinking to another, he is not to be interpreted as 
establishing their independence from one another. The skills of Oakeshott as an historian of 
political thought and a theorist of the state are that he links differing forms of thinking so as 
to see the messy world of practice as registering historical development that can be reflected 
upon philosophically. Philosophy is not set apart from history and practice but neither is to be 
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